

TITLE PAGE
AFRICAN UNION MISSION AND PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS IN AFRICA:
A CASE STUDY DANFUR CONFLICTS

BY

IBRAHIM DASUKI ALIYU
ADM. NO: 1011202029

BEING A FINAL YEAR RESEARCH PROJECT
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE USMANU
DANFODIYO UNIVERSITY, SOKOTO, IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT FOR THE AWARD OF B.SC DEGREE
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

OCTOBER, 2015

APPROVAL PAGE

This research project has been duly supervised and approved as having satisfied the requirement for the award of Bachelor of Science (B.Sc) Degree in Political Science in the Department of Political Science, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto.

Dr. Abubakar Abdullahi
(Project Supervisor)

Date

Dr. Abdulmajeed Alkali
(Head of Department)

Date

External Examiner

Date

DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to my beloved father late Alhaji Aliyu Hy dara Dogon Daji and my mother Hajiya Hannatu Dahiru Tambuwal.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

All praises be to Allah, the all knowing, who taught man what he knew not, glory be to Him for being my protector and Guardian throughout my stay in the university, and specially for protecting me with the strength to finish this task successfully. Salutation and benediction upon the noble Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) through where we received the living light of knowledge.

In the mean time, let me suggest the extent of my appreciation, first of all my project supervisor Dr. Abubakar Abdullahi for his guidance, tolerance, assistance and understanding.

I have benefited immensely from his experience I pray that may the Almighty Allah see you through all your endeavors and aspirations in life Amin.

My most ardent thanks conveyed to my parent, Alh. Aliyu Hydera Dogon Daji and Hajiya Hannatu Dahiru Tambuwal, for their tireless, moral, spiritual and financial support throughout the duration of my entire educational pursuit and beyond, May the Jannatul Firdausi be their final Abode Amin.

My appreciation goes to member of my family, my brother Muhammad Bello, Hussein, Jelani and Sadik and to my sisters: Fatima (Inno), Uwani, Zubaidah and Asma'u.

I equally acknowledge the vital role of my amiable friends and colleques: Muhammad Rabi'u Shu'aib, Mubarak Isahh Muhammad (Gije),

Bashar Abubakar Shehu, Umar Sadik Saraki (D. Game), Abdullahi Abubakar (Dogo Man), Zakari, Abdullahi (Zakks), Mustapha Lawal (Yellow), Hussein Ibrahim, Abdulsalam Bunza (Deco), Sadik (ATM) and our one only class rep, Jafar Ladan Umar.

I acknowledge all my course mates and friends whose name do not appear here, you made my stay in Danfodiyo University, worthwhile. My greater appreciation also goes to all my lecturers in the Department of Political Science, I pray Allah will reward them abundantly, you have made us strong and know who we are anywhere.

ABSTRACT

This research examines the role of the African Union (AU) in peacekeeping operations in the Darfur region, Sudan. The study examine the nature and the operation of AU military mission towards making peace in the region. With the aid of qualitative method, the research revealed that the issue of mandate, inadequate fire power and equipment alongside multilingual composition had hampered the effectiveness of the mission. It also revealed effectiveness of the mission. Thus, the study concluded that the aforementioned had indeed hampered the deterred of the mission from achieving its set objectives. Finally, the study recommend development of novel means of fund raising, concentration on preventive measures and harmonization of AU task force for the success of the mission in Darfur and elsewhere in Africa.

Title page	i
Approval page	ii
Dedication	iii
Acknowledgment	iv-v
Abstract	vi
Table of content	vii
Chapter One	
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 State of the Problem	3
1.3 Research Questions	4
1.4 Aims and Objectives	5
1.5 Significance of the Study	5
1.6 Research Methodology	6
1.7 Scope and Limitation	6
1.8 Research Assumptions	7
Chapter Two	
2.1 Introduction	8
2.2 Conceptualizing Peacekeeping	8
2.3 UN Peacekeeping Generation in Somalia	11
2.4 AU Peacekeeping in Burundi and Sudan	13
2.5 Theoretical Framework	18
Chapter Three: Case Study of Darfur Conflicts	
3.1 Introduction	23
3.2 Economy and Demography of Darfur Region	23
3.3 Problems Facing Darfur in Contemporary Times	26
3.4 Nature of the Darfur Conflict	28
3.5 African Union Peace Operation in Darfur	32
3.6 Test of Hypothesis	34
3.7 Major Research Findings	40
Chapter Four: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations	
4.1 Summary	41
4.2 Conclusion	42
4.3 Recommendations	43
References	45

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Peace is a stated loved and sought after by so many, be it for economic, social or political reasons. Basically, peace means the absence of hostility and the presence of humility among people. The absence of peace causes a lot of humans and problems to the people. It is on this premised that peace keeping had evolved to ensure the presence of adequate long lasting peace. Hence, peacekeeping as a term entails the keeping of agreed peace.

The United Nation (UN) being the body that initiated peacekeeping shows that the first peacekeeping operation data back to 1948 when the United Nations security council deployed it UN peacekeeping troops as observers to the middle East. (Caplan, 2008). Over the years, hundreds of thousands of military personnel as well as tens of thousands of UN police and other civilian from almost all countries have joined and served in various capacities around the world, although mostly in the third world (Caplan, 2008).

Peacekeeping has proven to be a very effective tool in ensuring transition from conflict to peace in affected nations or countries. Today, peacekeeping effort have exceeded the maintenance of peace and security and include, supporting the organization of election, protection and promotion of human right and also rendering assistance in restoring the rule of law or even creating it in some cases (Caplan, 2008). The success of any peacekeeping

cannot be determined easily as the operatives are usually placed in the most physical and politically challenging environs.

Peacekeeping has within it fold unique abilities including legitimacy, burden sharing and an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates. Peacekeeping operations are guided by; consents of the parties, meaning parties to the existing conflict must be part of the intended operation. In partiality; the peacekeeping operatives are neutral in carrying out their duties of restoring peace or normally to the state. The non use of force except in self-defense and defence of the mandate, operatives do not attack but only defend their scalp as well as that of the mandate (Caplan, 2004).

More than ten years have passed since Darfur, the western region in Sudan erupted in bloody conflict. The crisis in Darfur is not an accidental disaster or a catastrophe that humanitarian intervention can reverse or solve. The conflict is not as simple as presented in the media, which cast the conflict in terms of Arabs versus black Africans. The reality is far more muddled. It is a human tragedy brewing for decades that finally erupted into a vicious cycle of violence in 2003 (Cheadle and Prendergast, 2007).

The Darfur conflict is not only a problem for the Sudanese it is also a regional problem. The conflict is threatening the stability of countries such as Somalia, Chad and the Central African Republic. Looking at its nature, magnitude and internal dynamics that fuel it, one can argue that unless it is

addressed soon, the conflict has the potential to plague and the whole African region with a continuous cycle of violence and lawlessness.

The chaotic and atrocious nature of the Darfur conflict has attract much attention from the international community. As a result, regional and international actors have carried out several peace initiatives to end the violence. The peace efforts that constitute the Darfur peace process include N'Djamena peace negotiations of September 2003 and April 2004. The Addis Ababa peace negotiation of August 2004 – May 2006 and the Sirte peace negotiation of October 2007.

These initiatives have not made sustainable progress towards substantial peace. Since the peace effort began in 2003, every peace effort has been followed by increased violence and ultimately, the process has failed. It is against this background that this study examine the role of African Union in bringing an end to Darfur conflict.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The African Union (UN) has played a vital role in mediating peace agreement and assisting in their implementation, helping to reduce the level of conflict in several countries of African. However, the current situations in Darfur Sudan and other African countries have not changed too positively.

The Darfur crisis which is a largely misconstrued clash has waged on for quite a while and has primarily been about land. Scarcity of food and drought

had resulted in the forceful encroachment of the lands of the predominant black sandwiched farmers by the cattle and camel rearing Arabs or non-blacks of the upper and lower region of the Darfur area. The conflict had been destroying the peoples of Darfur since 1950's and has resulted in more less than could be accounted for.

Since conflict are intrinsically bound to occur, Africans must begin to address issues that will enable them manage conflict in the continent effectively. On this regard, this research investigates the role and challenges of the African Union (AU) peacekeeping operation mission in Darfur. Therefore, solutions and remedies to those need to be enquired upon so that peace and stability can be restored to this region and any other warring zone.

This research will therefore seek to answer the following pertinent questions;

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What is the nature and character of Darfur conflict?
2. How successful is the African Unions peacekeeping operation mission in Darfur conflict?
3. What role did the Sudanese government play in aiding the effectiveness of the peacekeepers?
4. What are the major challenges affecting AU mission in Darfur?

1.4 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The main objective of this is to examine the role of African Unions peacekeeping operations in Darfur. Specifically the study has the following objectives:

- i. To discuss the nature and character of Darfur conflict.
- ii. To examine the success of AU mission in Darfur conflict.
- iii. To discuss the role of Sudanese government in aiding the effectiveness of AU operation in Darfur.
- iv. To identify the challenges faced by the AU peacekeeping operations in the resolution of the conflict.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The need for Africa to begin in addressing issues that will enable them to manage conflict in the continent. This study therefore is expected to provide options in bringing about peace to the Darfur region and all other conflicting zones in general. It is also expected that the research will contribute to the frontier of human knowledge and stimulate further works on the continental organization and its peacekeeping techniques to ensure the achievement of better results. Furthermore, it is also of great concern that the non-resolution of the crisis may lead to spillover effects of the refugees and civil unrest in some neighboring countries which has varying negative effective on the host country.

1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this regard, this study employ qualitative instrument of data collection. This instrument involves the use of secondary source of data, including books, journals articles among others are to be consulted. For the books; the Usman Danfodiyo University Library provides tangible number of books mainly from the circulation, reference and reserve section of the establishment. The same establishment also provides journals sources. The department of political science resource center serve as another equally important source of materials.

The internet, a modern academic tool will serve as a great deal in providing links to the website and blog spots linked to the research. Collected data will be analyzed i.e. the data resulting from the above mentioned sources shall be dissected and analyzed using a method analyzing involving description and content explanations.

1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This research centers on the role of the African Union (AU) missions in peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Sudan. The research has been curtailed by the lack of tangible literature from libraries, the death of relevant and contemporary literature on the specific research. Also the recent change and division of the country has made some materials less useful since the country is no more a whole state. Time and financial constraints have also played a

detering role in getting more relevant materials for the conduct of this research.

Nonetheless, as much effort diligence as possible will be employed in the pursuit for an objective research.

1.8 RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS

The following shall be used as guides in the conduct of the research:

1. The attitude, behaviour and response of the Sudanese government served as a hindering factor for the success of the African Union mission in Darfur conflict.
2. The limited nature of the mandate, fire power, funding and equipment alongside the multilingual composition among the peacekeeping troops and personnel had limited the effectiveness of the mission.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter review the various existing literature relevant to the subject matter and its related concepts. It focuses on Sudan with emphasis on the Darfur region in relation to its crisis situation. In addition, peacekeeping mechanism in relation to the African Union (AU) is highlighted as well as the views on the mission in the region. Conflict itself is a forerunner to peacekeeping has been reviewed.

2.2 CONCEPTUALIZING PEACEKEEPING

Peacekeeping involves the coordinated presence of military, police and civilian personnel responsible for a wider range of tasks such as electoral monitoring, social and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction (un. org, 2006). There are the traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping operations.

The traditional UN peacekeeping was developed during the cold war era as a means to resolve conflicts between states. This is by deploying unarmed or lightly armed military personnel from a number of countries, under UN command, between the armed forces of the former warring parties. Peacekeepers could be called in when the major international powers tasked the UN with bringing closure to conflicts threatening regional stability and

international peace and security (un. org, 2006). Peacekeepers were deployed when a ceasefire was in place and the parties to the conflict had given their consent. UN troops observed from the ground and reported impartially on adherence to the ceasefire, troop withdrawal or other element of peace agreement. This gave time and breathing space for diplomatic efforts to address the underlying causes of a conflict. An example of this was United Nation emergency force operation in response to invasion of Egypt by Israel, France and UK in 1956 (un. org, 2007).

The end of cold war precipitated a dramatic shift in the UN and brought about multidimensional peacekeeping. In a new spirit of cooperation, the security council established larger and more complex United Nation peacekeeping operations, often to help implement comprehensive peace agreement between protagonists in intra-state conflict. The United Nation department of peacekeeping operation was created in 1992 to support this increased demand for complex peacekeeping (un. org, 2006).

Example of this was United Nation transition assistance group which was first of such missions was a resounding success (Liu, 1998).

The success was due to the full cooperation of warring parties, the contributory support the United Nation security council (UNSC) and the timely provision of the necessary financial resources (the blue Helmet 1996, p.229).

According to Bellamy et al, (2010), peacekeeping provides important insight into the codes of conduct that states have collectively devised to cope

with life in an international society of states. Furthermore, it foster the relationship between the great powers and the maintenance of international peace and security, and creation and diffusion of shared norms about the appropriateness of welfare itself and legitimate conduct within wars.

Rubinstein (1993) added peacekeeping mission may mean many different things to different people, because each may have a different political understanding of the situation. Peacekeeping operations take place in the context of the daily lives of multiple communities, diplomatic, military (humanitarian) and local. Each of these communities embodies cultural constituted ways of behaving and understanding the objectives and practices of the operation. Sometimes the intersection of these cultural spheres is problematic.

The Australian Network (2007) while taking a more scholarly approach viewed peacekeeping as a process where a group of lightly armed military forces separates two parties from a conflict who have agreed to a ceasefire, so that they can keep the peace. This view is quite synonymous to the current situation as the African Union (AU) operatives were lightly equipped both in terms of equipment, fighting power and a mandate. And the precedence of the Abuja talk which gave AU a book of reference.

Caplan, (2008) defined peacekeeping as the deployment of national or more commonly multinational forces for the purpose of helping to control and resolve an actual or potential armed conflict between or within states. Thus,

seeing peacekeeping as not just a practice for resolving interstate conflict but also intra conflict as well which really happen more often with the contemporary increase in internal strives and conflict around the globe.

2.3 UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA

The collapse of the central government in Somalia in 1991 came after decades of dictatorial rule by Siad Barre and three years of civil war. The coalition which succeeded Barre became embroiled in its own internal strife which led to increasing factionalisation in the country. The UN intervened to address the insecurity in the country with the deployment of the United Nation UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in May 1992. The feuding class made it virtually impossible for UNOSOM to deploy effectively and uphold its mandates. Consequently the UN drew upon charter of its charter and deployed what was thought to be a more robust mission in the form of Unified Task Force (UNITAF), ostensibly led by the United States of America (USA) and dubbed Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF was to set the tasked with undertaking disarmament of warring factions as well as peace building. However, the obstacles encountered by UNOSOM resurfaced and the mission gradually became discredited and withdraw entirely from Somalia in 1995 (Sahnoun, 2000).

Thus, in December 1992, the UN sent in a 33,000 multinational coalition force known as UNOSOM II which took over from US led force.

UNOSOM II had the additional mandate of restoring peace and stability. UNOSOM II comprised of forces from Belgium, France, Italy, South Korea, USA, others include Egypt, Nigeria and Pakistan. However, there was continuing lack of progress in the peace process and in national reconciliation. Due to loss of her personnel after ill-fated “Black Hawk Down” episode in which 18 US soldiers were killed after the downing of 2 American helicopters, the US pulled out her forces from UNOSOM II followed by other western nations. This undermined the achievement of UN objectives in Somalia and prevented the coalition beyond 31 March 1995 (The Blue Helmets, p. 316).

It is generally claimed that as far as humanitarian assistance was concerned, UNOSOM II was a success; but with respect to the resolution of the conflict, it is regarded as one of the unsuccessful United Nations peacekeeping operations, which presented bitter experiences and essential lessons to be learnt. Over 10 years after the pre-mature termination of UNOSOM II, Somalia is still in deep crisis without stable government resulting in severe suffering by the populace. It is also been described as one of the most dangerous places on earth today. (Dualeh, 1994 p.15).

Some of the challenges identified that led to the failure of the UNOSOM are slow rate of UN deployment, inadequate man power and logistics as well as non cooperation of warlords. Others are non effective mandates, ineffective enforcement of arms embargo, non tackling of root cause of conflict and non participation of troops from developed nations. These challenges impeded

the effectiveness of United Nation peacekeeping operations in Africa are not unique to the continent they also affect the peacekeeping efforts of the UN in other parts of the world (Ram, 2007).

2.4 AU PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN BURUNDI AND SUDAN

Keller (1995) posited that the launch of the African Union had marked a fundamental shift from the principle of non interference in the internal conflict of member states had it predecessor. The organization of African Unity (OAU), so totally ineffective in addressing the dualing conflict of post independence African. Thus, the new African organization developed a bigger concern and played a vital/better role in the enforcement of peace by making the affairs of the sovereign member states their as well.

The African Union peacekeeping in Burundi (AMIB) and Sudan (AMIS) were the first peacekeeping operations entirely initiated planned and executed by AU members. These peacekeeping operation represent milestones for the AU in terms of operationalizing peace keeping. As case studies, they provided lessons for the AU on how to better fulfill it role and readiness in peacekeeping operations and its performance in these peacekeeping operations is inductive of the current African strategic reality.

Conceptually, the regionalization of contemporary complex multi-faceted African peacekeeping operations in Burundi and Sudan, conducted in the midst of armed conflict, has profoundly impacted the evolution of the

traditional concept of peacekeeping. Both AMIB and AMIS challenged the traditional concepts related to peacekeeping. AU leaders did not seek the consensus of all the conflicting parties to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of the respective countries armed conflict, nor was a formal cease fire agreement in place prior to the interventions. However both operations required the consent of the ruling government to enter the country and AU peacekeepers operated under a limited mandate. In Sudan, AU peacekeepers troops did not have the authority or man power to disarm the Janjaweed and other paramilitary forces, since the mandate stipulated only the peacekeeping operation authority to monitor the peace agreement but not to enforce the peace (Malan, 1999).

The success of the AU's involvement in Burundi and Sudan can be measured by three criteria: the fulfillment of the mandate of the peacekeeping operation as set by the AU: the resolution of the underlying disputes precipitating the conflict, and the contribution of peacekeeping operation to the maintenance of peace and security by reducing or eliminating conflict in the area of operation (Finch, 2009).

AMIB deployed in April 2003 in the absence of a comprehensive and all inclusive ceasefire in Burundi. The Mandate of AMIB was to facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire agreement to ensure that the defense and security situation was stable and further, to protect politicians who had return from exile and would assume roles in the transitional government. AMIB also

sought to create conditions that would allow internally displaced persons and refugees, who lived in the eight Burundian provinces and three refugee camps in Tanzania, to return to their homes. The AMIB mission also had the task of establishing conditions that would enable UN peace operation to enter the country, since the UN was reluctant to enter a situation that had the potential to relapse into conflict. A comprehensive ceasefire was reached on 16 November 2003. The mandate of AMIB concluded on 31st May 2004, leaving the responsibility of peacekeeping to the UN operations in Burundi (ONUB). AMIB was thus only a “holding operation” pending the UN sectioned peacekeeping mission (FES briefing paper; 2006).

Notwithstanding, severe challenges, AMIB (2003) can be credited with stabilizing about 95 percent of Burundi, with facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and with providing adequate protecting of the designated returning exile leaders. Throughout its period of operation AMIB succeeded in de-escalating a potentially volatile situation. In the absence of the AU mission, Burundi would have been left to its own devices, which probably would have resulted in an escalations of violent conflict.

When measuring the success through the identified three methods we can conclude that AMIB had fulfilled its mission; contributing to the resolution of the dispute by addressing its underlying causes and contributed to peace and in Burundi even in the face of serous policy, institutional and conceptual limitation (FES briefing paper, 2006).

On the other hand, the involvement of the AU in Sudan (AMIS I and II later separately AMID African mission in Darfur) represent one of the most critical test of the role of AU in African peacekeeping operations (Sharamo, 2009).

The instability in Darfur has assumed regional and international dimensions, evolving into a large-scale humanitarian crisis in Sudan and bordering countries, claiming over 200,000 lives displacing over 2 million people and poses security threats to neighboring countries. The AU intervened with the deployment of a peacekeeping force and by initiating peace talks seeking an agreement to disarm the Jan Janjaweed, to rebuild Darfur and the integration of various armed groups into the national army. The AU was initially authorized only to monitor the ceasefire with a 120 person ceasefire monitoring commission and more than 6,000 AU peacekeepers but no peace enforcement mandate.

In contrast to AMIB, when measuring the success of the AU peacekeeping operations in Sudan through identified three methods, the finding is that these criteria were not successfully addressed, especially the adequacy of the structure of AMIS and the effectiveness of its operations. The underlying reasons for the conflict were not successfully addressed due to the limited and inadequate mandate of the initial AU deployment. In Sudan as arranged between the AU and the Sudan government. The initial purpose on the

operation was monitoring, not peacekeeping reminiscent of the ineffectiveness of OAU deployments (Sharamo, 2009).

Aims has been criticized for deploying slowly and the fact that it only had to protect the civilian and military observers, and could not intervene when civilians were under threat (Takirambudde, 2009).

Furthermore, the contribution of the AU peacekeeping in the resolution of the underlying disputes generating the conflict and the maintenance of peace and security has been very limited, institutionally, this situation was caused by a lack of sufficient manpower and essential equipment such as armored personnel carriers and helicopter, to carry out even the most elementary of peacekeeping task.

According to Scorgie (2007); the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has demonstrated political will and a resolve to act has not necessarily equated to having an ability to do so, she also saw financial constraints as limiting factors for the attainment of success in the mission. Naturally finance has always been a problem in most cases of international energy as even the United Nation (UN) experiences shortage of funds an equitable analysis into the intricacies of poor or inadequate funding of this mission in particular. Shortage of funds or resource really has served as a impediment for the mission.

In order, for a way forward for the success of the mission, the challenges needs to be overcome unlike other peacekeeping operation where these

challenges are less, these ways or criteria which makes those challenges less needs to be adapted, lessons that could be learn from these operations;

- 1. Robust Operational Mandate:** There is need to negotiate a robust mandate of AU mission with the contending parties. The acceptant of such mandates by the warring parties would signify their level of commitment to the peace process.
- 2. Adequate Funding and Logistics:** Inadequate funding and logistics have inhabited the deployment of adequate troop level required for AU missions. Therefore, the needs to make deliberate efforts to adequately fund the AU peacekeeping operation. This will ensure availability of troops equipment and logistics at the required level, thus such mission could be successful.

2.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Due to the possession of quite a number of flaws of democratic peace, structural functionalism and realism. The theory of human needs is one which has been able to provide a basis for the research. Burton (1993) is viewed as the theory's most prominent scholar. Burton argue that when an individual or groups derived its fundamental need for identity, security, recognition or equal participations within the society, protracted conflict is inventible. To resolve such conflict, it is essential that needs that are threatened be identified and subsequent restructuring of relationship or the social system take place in a way

that needs of all individuals in the group are recommended. Burton viewed the concept of basic human needs as offering a possible method of grounding the field of conflict analysis and resolution in a defensible theory of the person.

To this theory, the needs most salient to an understanding of destructive social conflict were those for identity, recognition security and personal development. The great promise of human needs theory in Burtons view, was it would provide a relatively objective basis, transcending local politics and cultural differences for understanding the sources of conflict designing conflict resolution process and founding conflict analysis and resolution as an autonomous discipline. Notably the theory has three virtues:

- i. The theory resolves to make a valid distraction between struggles that can be dealt with by employing the conventional trinity of force, law and power based negotiation. And those whose resolution requires measures.
- ii. Equipped with a needs based map of the field. Conflict analyst and resolves to understand the contradictions inherent in general notions like negotiation and dispute resolution process corresponding to a conflict underlying generic sources; and
- iii. A needs based approach to social conflict undermines conventional notions of conflict causation, in particular that the destructive social conflicts are produced instrumentally by a few manipulative leaders or expressively by the sheer existence of cultural or ideological differences.

Perhaps, most importantly the theory employs unsatisfied needs of an independent variable to explain why ruling class manipulation or cultural differences sometimes generate conflict. As argued by Burton that when an individual or groups is deprived its fundamental need for identity, security, recognition or equal participation within the society, protracted conflict is inevitable. Now, the Darfur crisis has its genesis from the encroachment practices of the cattle grazes coupled with ideological reasons which resulted in the aligning of the government with the grazes against the farmers of Darfur shows a link with the needs theory assumption on denial of security, personal development and recognition. For even an index would show how the Darfur region gravely is lacking behind other region in all sectors. This is to say the people of Darfur acted up in conflict as a result of their deprived needs and that the action of AU in conflict analysis and resolution as seen its peace talks and peacekeeping efforts are what the needs theory posit.

Thus, the theory recognizes a conflict born of certain deprivations and that resolving or solving such a conflict involves the understanding and identification of such deprived needs and provision of a way.

Institutional theory also, is a framework for analyzing social (particularly organizations) phenomena, which views the social world as a significantly comprised institutions enduring rules, practices, and structures that sets conditions on action. Institutions are fundamental explaining the social world because they are built into the social order, and direct the flow of social

life. They are the constants that determine the rules of variation. Institutions conditions action because departures from them are automatically counteracted by social controls that make deviation from social order costly. The effects of great institutions such as language, religion, laws and family are so clear and widespread that one can hardly imagined social research that would not attend to them. Consequently, the history of institutional theory is as long as the history of social theory. The first systematic to theorized what institution are and how they influence actions and structure are found in the writings of two classical scholars Max Weber and Emil Durkheim. Although Weber did not use the term institution his notion of cultural rules a system is close to our present understanding of the concept of institution. The interpretive approach of Weber highlighted the idea that action is social in the sense that the actor attaches a subjective meaning to it so meanings always mediate social action. Therefore, the role beliefs or cultural systems become clear they provide a set of meaning require to interpret actions.

For Durkheim institution are symbolic system, system of knowledge, belief and moral authority. He highlights the idea that this symbolic system are subjective products of human interaction but experience by people as objective. So institutions exist and play a role in peoples life in the same way as the external facts. Moreover, institutions posses moral authority and are back by sanctions.

The resurgence of institutional theory in the 1980's began with investigation of effects of institution context on the structure of organizations (Meyes and Rowan, 1977) overtime researchers began to theorize the dynamics of institutional context itself. For instance they examine how social facts can reach the status of an institution i.e. become institutionalize. They also address question like how social actors can affect institutional context, this effort has expanded institutional theory to constitute a wide range of social research.

This is why the institutional approach is much relevant in addressing problems relating to African Union Peacekeeping mission in Darfur.

CHAPTER THREE

CASE STUDY OF DARFUR CONFLICTS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Darfur which stands for “home of fur” covers an area of some 493,180km, with an estimated population growth of about 6 million inhabitants (Arkell, 1951). This population is well characterized by multi-ethnic and constrating lifestyles. The region comprises of three federal states namely; Gharb Darfur (West Darfur), Janub Darfur (South Darfur, Shamal Darfur (North Darfur). They make their living in different ways but all share the scarce resources available in the region. This is viewed as the genesis of this age long conflict i.e. the degradation and scarcity of resources in the west. The region has Al-Fashir, Nyala and Al-Geneina as its main towns. It is characterized by a large arid plateau the Marrala mountains (Jebel/Marra) and a range of volcanic peaks rising up to 3:00m (10,000ft) in the centre of the region.

3.2 ECONOMY AND DEMOGRAPHY OF DARFUR REGION

Darfur has its economy based on subsistence agriculture; producing cereals, fruits, tobacco as well as livestock in the drier North. During the last three decades, serious ecological impediments such as prolonged climate dry coupled with severe intensive exploitation of soil, forest and other natural resources as well as overgrazing by livestock and increased human population

further degraded the naturally fragile environment of Northern Sudan. The ecological degradation has reached a level where the contenders see no reason and hence head for blood against peace. Many of the present's conflicts are not being fought along traditional, political borders, but along ecological borders that divides richer and poorer eco zones (Dummoye, 2005).

Historically, between 1650 and 1971, Darfur was independent state known as the fur sultanate and it resisted several attempt to bring it under foreign domination until the 20th century in 1917 when the British colonist annexed it to Sudan (Dunmoye, 2005). Since then, there has not been any appreciable effort by the central government to develop the region economically, politically and culturally, hence leaving the region to lag behind. Some of the development challenges affecting the region are; lack of transportation and communication which as part of the deficiency.

The main ethnics of the fur people, are the ethnically African people and the Arab Baggara. Others include African Zaghawa Masalit and the Midab. The Baggara are divided into several tribe, such as the Misseiria that speaks languages other than Arabic. Many of these groups also have significant population in neighboring Chad, particularly the Zaghawa and Baggara (Grohol, 2005). However, these ethnic groups are divided into two based language and race; those who have Arabian origin and the local non Arab population. This division is consist with and further emphasized and sharpened by the occupational and territorial structure of the region.

The fur is the largest ethnic group in the Darfur region and was founder of the fur Sultanate and the traditional rules of the region. The other non-Arab ethnic groups are the Zaghawa nomads, Merdob, Masalit, Berli, Tama, Morati and Tunjur. The Arab tribes in the Darfur region namely pastoral nomads consist of the Habanian, Beni Hussein, Zayadiy, Ben Helba, Djamawa, Rezeighat, the Maharia, in addition to the Arab urban Merchants and government officials (Dunmoye, 2005).

The Arab in this region developed a feeling of superiority to the other ethnic groups and also a tendency of towards violence. According to them, farmers and other rural groups are inferior in all ramification of life. The Arab nomads also developed a military organization to match the violent tendencies in them which is headed by an agreed as the leading warrior. There are three ecological zones in the region. The first is the North and zone, which is a desert spread of the Libyan Sahara inhabited predominantly by Arab camel nomads. This is the most disaster prone ecological fragile zone. The vulnerable ethnic groups in this zone are always active in the armed conflict of the central rich agricultural zone whose occupants are settled traditional farmers. The third zone is the eastern and south semi-arid zone mainly cattle pastoralist nomads inhabit this zone. This zone is ecologically stable group in this zone. This zone has suffered drought during the two decades to the extent that some of the inhabitant were forced to move to western central zone.

3.3 PROBLEMS FACING DURFUR IN CONTEMPORARY TIMES

The war in Darfur in February 2003, when the Sudan liberation movement/army (SLM/A) and justice equality movement (JEM) forces launched attacks against government military installations in frustrations as a retaliation more precedent by the decades of political marginalization and economic neglect by the government.

Population

3.3.1 Table 1: Comparison of Human Development Sudan Darfur 2000

Sudan	31.2 million
Darfur	6.0 million
North Darfur	1.46 million
South Darfur	2.76 million
West Darfur	1.78

Source: Fouad Ibrahim: /2004/

3.3.2 Table 2: Comparison of Human Development Indices in Sudan, Darfur 2000

Location	Primary school attendances	Medical doctors 100,000 inhabitant	Hospital beds 160,000 inhabitant
Sudan	47%	16	74
Darfur	31%	1.9	2.5
South Sudan	21%	2.8	68
Khartoum	88%	46	111

Source: fouad Ibrahim: /2004/

From the Human Development Indices (HDI), it could be seen that the government of Sudan (GOS) had systematically neglected Darfur region, with the exemption of southern Sudan Darfur occupied the last place in HDI within the state Sudan in areas of education, health economy and standard of living. Table 3.2.1 also shows the large difference in the population structure of the

region with Sudan having an exponential edge over the Darfur region, and this was prior to the full scale conflict.

The rebel movement i.e. the SLM/A and the JEM appeared to have taken the government by surprise and enjoyed some success, notably the destruction of half dozen military aircrafts and capture of an Air Force general El-Fashir air port in April 2003 (De Waal, 2004) in response, the government decided to increase its support for the Janjaweed militia and deployment of some of its own forces from air force and the army. The Janjaweed subsequently engaged in full scale responsive, in which they killed massacred even rape and tortured lot of the rebels. At this stage Sudan's counter insurgency operation had spilled across border into Chad resulting in the death of approximately 1.2 million to flee their homes (Benin, 2004). Around 200,000 of these were estimated to have crossed into Chad while the remaining majority remained internally displaced within camps in Darfur (which remain vulnerable to continued Janjaweed attacks and exploitation and sealed off from most international relief agencies) (Amnesty international, 2004). By the middle of 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that between 240 and 440 people were dying every day because of the conflict (United Nations, 2004). By September 2004, the situation which the western world described as the most serious humanitarian emergency in the world today (Benn, 2004) had deteriorated further, with the number of death estimated to be over 70,000 (De Waal, 2004).

3.4 NATURE OF THE DARFUR CONFLICT

Nature had it that the settled indigenous non-Arabs in the central zone are sandwiched between the hostile Arab camel nomads in the northern arid zone equally hostile cattle herding Arabs in the southern Semi-Arid zone. The nomads being faced with depleted dried out pasture began venturing into the lands and farms of the sedentary farmers to feed their livestock. They (the nomads) allowed their camels and cattles to graze into not just to the land of the farmer but also their farms, the farmers already suffering from poverty and drought. This led to the farmers picking up arms to defend their lands.

This unwanted armed conflict among the various ethnic groups in Darfur has experienced to major phases in its development, the low intensity stage characterized by sporadic raids and skirmishes between 1950's to the 1970 and the high intensity stage with persistent and large scales conflict that have been fought since 1980's. The conflict main reasons were; the grazing of the farms by the nomads, animal theft access to pasture, water, territorial conquest, racial prejudice, political prejudice and ethnic cleansing. It is important to note that the full scale civil conflict started in 1985 at the height of the drought that ravaged the region. This conflict is recorded to have three rounds. The first was between the Zaghawa and Maharia camel pastoralists of the upper Northern Desert Belt against the settled for farmers. The second involved all non-Arabs farming communities of Jebel Mana area against all of the Arabs (Lanz, 2008).

The third round occurred in February 2003 which involves the government of Sudan and allied militias; the “Janjaweed” against an insurgency. War erupted in Darfur in the beginning of 2003 when the allied rebel groups, the Sudan liberation Movement/Army (SLA) and the justice and equality movement (JEM), attacked government military installations. The rebel took up arms to protect their communities against a campaign by government backed militias recruited among groups of Arab extraction in Darfur and Chad. The militias called Janjaweed, have over the past three years received government offensive led to the massive looting and mass rape in contravention of common article 3 of the Geneva convention prohibiting attacks on civilians (Fouad, 2004).

This current conflict on Darfur involve the Sudan government and allied militias: The “Janjaweed” against an insurgency composed of two groups. The Sudan Liberation Army/Movement the rebel groups were mainly composed of three ethnics groups, namely; Zaghawa, Fur and Masaalit. However, since the current conflict escalated in early, 2003, the members of some smaller tribes such as the Jebel and Dorok people have also joined the rebellion following Janjaweed militia attacks on the communities. Some Arab tribes and even some non-Arab tribes have also joined the government back-militia.

The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) came into focus February 2003. It was formerly called the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) at the beginning. It was after it capture the town of Gulu that it changed its name to the SLA. In early

2003, the SLA attack the capital of north Darfur and damaged several government aircrafts and helicopters and looted fuel and arms depots. In another major attack the SLA rebels again looted government dismissed the governors of north and west Darfur and other key officials and increased military strength in Darfur (Benn, 2004).

The Chadian authorities and members of the Chadian armed forces have not been left out of the Darfur conflict. The reason is that the Chad is a neighbor to Sudan, sharing similar ethnic formation, religion and other socio-cultural and economic factors. More so, of all the Sudan's neighbours, Chad bore more of the burden of the refugee problems that heralded not just Darfur conflict but also the North-South conflict that lasted for over two decades. By March 2004, More than 110,000 displaced people in Darfur were reported to be taking refuge in Chad (the economist, 2005). The people of Chad supported both sides of the Darfur conflict the Al-Bashir government forces and its proxies, armed Arab civilian groups (Janjaweed) and the "rebel" black African groups of the SLA and JEM.

As a result of its resolve to annihilation the Darfur rebellion, and partly because of rabid Arab nationalism, the Al-Bashir government with its Janjaweed proxies has launched attacks on civilian groups on increased scale, number, and the brutality and has been conducted on villages and towns in the absence of rebel presence or military targets. Civilians sharing the ethnicity of the rebel movements, namely the Fur, Masaalit and Zaghawa and a few

small tribes have become the main targets of government military offensives aimed at destroying any real or perceived support base of the rebel forces. Government forces and Janjaweed militias have inflicted a campaign of force displacement murder, pillage and rape on hundreds of thousands of civilians over the past fourteen months (The Economist, 2005:13). This has continued, albeit at a low scale since the intervention of the forces of the African Union for peacekeeping in Darfur. In line with fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, all parties involved in Darfur conflict are obliged to distinguish at all times between civilian property and militia objectives. Acts or threats of violence intended to spread terror among the civilian population in particular murder, physical or mental torture, rape, mutilation pillage and collective punishment, are prohibited. The destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population such as food stuffs, agricultural areas of food production, crops drinking water installations and supplies is also prohibited (HRW Report, 2004:13).

Many villages have been destroyed, usually burned, with all property looted. Assets such as water points and mills, have been destroyed in an apparent effort to render the villages uninhabited. Many civilians have been killed and injured by aerial bombardment and militia raids. Militia and government forces reportedly raped hundreds of women and allied militias to force rural civilians from their homes and render them destitute in government towns and camps (HRW Report, 2004:14).

Since the Sudanese government decided to attack civilians rather than concentrate on crushing the groups of SLA and JEM, the conflict in Darfur started to attract international sympathy to the extent that some sections of international community has branded the war activities of the Sudanese government as “acts of genocide”.

3.5 AFRICAN UNION PEACE OPERATIONS IN DARFUR

The historical foundation of the African Union of African state on early confederation by Kwame Nkrumah in 1960’s as well as subsequent attempt united African, including the organization of African Unity (OAU), which was established on 25 May 1963. The idea of creating the AU was revived in the Mid – 1990’s under the leadership of Libyan head of state Muammar Al-Gaddafi the head of state and government of the OAU issued the site declaration (named after sirte in Libya) on 9 September 1999, calling for the establishment of an African Union. The declaration was followed by summit at Lome^l in 2000, when the constitutive Act of African Union was adopted and at Luska in 2001, when plan for the implementation of the Union was adopted.

Seeing the AU was a progressive organization from the remains of the OAU, or a better version of it. Nonetheless, the AU in maintaining suitable for its participations in the Darfur crisis would have resolved to foremost in the constitutive act of the African Union (2000) which provides the required mandate and the international framework for peacekeeping. In this regard,

while the act stresses the principles of peaceful resolution of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, it also provides the right of the union to intervene in a member state in respect of grave circumstances, namely; war crimes, genocide and crime against humanity and for the right of members states to request interventions in order to restore peace and security (Constitutive Act of AU, 2001). This applies to the situation in Darfur where the Janjaweed militias have engaged in “ethnic cleansing” and plethora of crimes against humanity (Mepham and Ramsbothan, 2006:14 – 21).

The second pillar of the AU framework for preventive action in conflict situation is the protocol establishing the peace and security council of the African Union in July 2002, the protocol which became effective in December 2004 upon ratification by members is the lynchpin of peacekeeping by the African Union Designed to deal with the “threat or breaches of peace” the protocol is conceived to operate within partnership for peace with the UN.

Like the constitutive Act, the protocol also provides for peacekeeping and related functions and recommendation for intervention in member state going through crisis situation. By drawing explicit link between security and democratic practices, good governance, the role of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for sanctity of life and international humanitarian law; the protocol provides the criteria for intervention in internal conflict to protect and safeguard life and to prevent them from spilling into neighboring countries.

The mandate of African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (including extensions) comprised monitoring and observation of compliance with Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCA); assistance in the process of confidence building; contributor to security environment that allow both humanitarian relief delivery and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees; and the protection of civilians (an aspect that was strengthened during the course of time and following much criticism; see international crisis group 2005: O'Neil and Cassis, 2005).

The threat to civilians posed by countries violence in Darfur rightly demanded the intervention by the African Union (O'Neil and Cassis, 2005).

3.6 TEST OF HYPOTHESIS

Hypothesis 1: The attitude, behavior and respond of the Sudanese government served as hindering factor the success of the African Union.

To begin, Alex De Waal is credited to have written the below with regards the Sudanese National Government in Darfur Crisis. In the Darfur talks, the Khartoum delegation has stone walled on major issues. "It objected to upgrading the small AU observers force from 300 to 3,500 with an increase in its mandate to include protecting civilians and was then forced to accept this measure by the UN Security Council. The government negotiating strategy reflects an emphasis on short term tactical advantage with no intention on how to reach a political solution".

Moving on, a former AU sector commander in Darfur expressed frustration as to how the Sudanese government made it very difficult for funds to be transferred from Addis Ababa to AU troops on the ground. The process involved a long winded route before funds reached AU personnel in Sudan. This not only delay remittance of funds but also created some apprehension among the troops deployed eventually resulted in low morale among the troops. On this background, it appeared as if Khartoum's sole interest was to frustrate the AU. Other instances showed how the government acted in bad faith by misleading AMIS officers or giving false Intel on crucial matters. This sort of attitude diverted AMIS from investigating real attractive while weakening the meager resource and energy of personnel.

While the Sudanese government gave the impression of doing its best to resolve the conflict in Darfur, evidence proved that it was actually undertaking activities that intensified the conflict. A brigadier general of Sudanese military explains to AMIS observer that he was given orders to protect civilians and open the roads for commercial traffic. At the same time he had orders from Khartoum to clear all villages on the main road. Needless to say, his priority was the letter based on the fact that he allowed the Janjaweed militia and some of his uniformed troops to launch an attack on Labado in January, 2005.

A further dent in the government credibility occurred when a document was seized from a Janjaweed official exposed the complicity of Khartoum in activities of the notorious militia group. The document explicitly order

commanders and security officers in Darfur to change the demography of Darfur and make it void of African tribes something the government always denied. On this wise, Khartoum gives on record as having abdicated its responsibility to protect its civilian population.

AMIS doubted the sincerity of the government on the basis that the letter hardly kept its promise. Although signing agreement with the Humanitarian ceasefire commission on 8 April 2004 as well as Abuja protocols of 9 November 2004, the militia continued to cause Mayhem among civilians while they looked on the other way. A Janjaweed militia leader, Musa Mohamed Hassab admitted the complicity of Khartoum in the activities of the militia. Musa said “we were told to fight by the government, we also wish for this, why should we stop now? He even acknowledge that they were provided with logistics including weapons, foods, money and ID cards (Monsoray, 2009).

Base on this assumption, the Sudanese government worked towards diminishing and destabilization of the AMIS mission. In light of the above presented data, this could be said to be true. The fact that of the evidence that the Janjaweed and the government worked hand in hand undeniable.

Hypothesis 2: The limited nature of the mandate, firepower, funding and equipment alongside the multi lingual composition among peacekeeping troops and personnel had limited effectiveness for the mission.

On this process, the following data will be observed;

- **Restricted Mandate**

Broadly, AIMS mandate as it is agreed upon came about after protracted negotiations among the warring factions under auspices of the AU in 2004. The mandate was restricted to monitoring the terms of the ceasefire agreed between Khartoum and the rebel factions and protecting themselves and those monitoring ceasefire agreement.

This mandate amidst difficulties in its initial implementation was enhanced to AMIS II five month later with a strengthened force. The new force was mandated to ensure that all parties complied with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA), which was signed in N'djamena on 8th April 2004 between warring factions, improve the general security in Darfur and oversee the return of the new mandate authorized AMIS to project civilians whom it encountered under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability (O'Neil and Cassis, 2005:26).

One cannot help but ponder the ambiguity of this task one hand, AMIS was supposed to protect civilians who were the prime targets of the Sudanese government and its militia allies. On the other hand, AMIS recognized that this same government had the prime responsibility to protect the very civilians it was persecuting (Mansoray, 2009:31-38).

- **Financial and Logistical Constraint**

In terms of logistic AMIS lacked the military material and support mechanism that could have at least served as deterrence to the government

forces, Janjaweed militia or rebel groups who challenged AU personnel on many occasions. Deterrent is a very important strategy in military warfare as heavy weapons and ammunitions could have at least slowed down the activities of especially the Janjaweed, who are believed to be responsible for most of the atrocities during the initial stage of the conflict (Appiah, 2008).

A former AMIS sector commander argues that AMIS's shattering and limitations were due to a seriously constrained concepts of operation, a chronic lack of resource and serious strategic and operational gaps. He further cited the lack of civil military coordination and inadequate medical services as challenges that dogged the mission (Human Right Watch, 2006).

AMIS basically operated under short term arrangements, financial support for mission operation was far from adequate. For instance, funds would be approved for a three month period after which the mission waited for more financial good will to continue to work (NEIMACRO group, 2006).

This sort of adhoc arrangement hampered the operation of the mission as it made planning beyond three month impossible. A significant source of funding came through the African Peace Facility (APA) funded by European Union to the Tune of 350 million Euros (NEIMACRO, 2006). Since the mission continued to be crippled financially, it activities could only be predicted on short coming basis.

- **Equipment Diversity**

African Nations passes on array of armaments from second world war vintage rifles to modern Jet fighters countries of origin of these weapons are diverse, including; the United States, Germany, North and South Korea, Iran, China and former Soviet Union. The continent also has several home-grown weapon makers, mostly manufacturing small arm but some capable of more complex item such as missiles. South Africa had at one point even developed nuclear war heads, through these were purposely dismantled nearly two decades ago.

There are numerous reason for such a diversity of weapons sources. This wide array of equipment can create numerous problems for a joint force. Communication becomes difficult when various transmitters and receivers of different vintages and from a variety of manufacturers to troops, and battle field assessment not being relayed to commanders. Also, there is little to no cost savings from volume discounts for ammunition or parts because so many African countries use so many different weapons. Had there been agreements to purchase the same type of item, say a mortar then the countries could have used their buying power to leverage the supplier for a better price per unit (Feld Man, 2008:267-279).

3.7 MAJOR RESEARCH FINDINGS

- The first was with regards to the hindrance played by the Sudanese national government and it was proven to be correct with respect to the given data.
- The nature and character of the Darfur crisis was dealt with as its been realized to be resulting from land struggles against popular misconceptions of it being a racial war although it does not have certain features suggesting that the conflict had also wage on for considerable time as it is divided into three main epochs; the 1950's battles, the second relative 1980's clashes and the latest clash of 2003.
- The peacekeeping did face a number of problems and challenges in carrying out their roles and these are: Restricted Mandate, Piecemeal Corporation from the Sudanese government, Logistics and financial constraints among others.
- Although the mission faced quite a number of limiting factors, positive and progressive changes and actions were also recorded during the time of the mission at the region.

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 SUMMARY

This study examined the African Union mission and peacekeeping operation in Darfur's conflict, which is largely resulting from clashes that waged quite for a while and has primarily been about lands of the predominantly black sandwiched farmers by cattle and camel rearing Arabs or non-blacks of the upper and lower region of the Darfur area. The conflict had been destroying the peoples since 1950's and has resulted in more loss that could be accounted for.

The research employed qualitative using secondary source of data generated from different articles, journals, books and online sources in relation to Darfur crisis, the made available data show that the nature and character of the crisis was resulting from land struggle as oppose to popular misconceptions of being it a social war. The peacekeeping did face a number of problems and challenges in carrying out their role e.g. restricted mandate, piecemeal corporation, logistics and financial constraints among others, despite the aforementioned challenges positive progress was recorded interms consensus building like ceasefire agreement.

In the light of above the research recommended that the AU should concentrate on preventive aspect of conflict in order to minimize resource of

peacekeeping, also AU should earmarked for observers or peacekeeping missions should be involved in joint training to harmonize their equipment in addition to their tactics in line with UN policy on conflict management. However, African Solo mission was able to bring about positive changes and progress in the region despite a large number of odds. The mission resulted in humanitarian aid, political and military advancement as well as civil political achievements.

4.2 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the African Union is credited to have formed and sent in a peace monitoring group into the Darfur region after a peace agreement signing. This was concerning a clash in Darfur region involving herders and farmers over land. The African Union had two main missions before its hybrid mission with the UN. However, before this hybrid operation was instituted, African Union Solo mission was able to bring about positive changes and progress in the region despite a large number of odds. The host government of Sudan is noted to have played a dominant role in making the operation as hitch full as possible but still the mission resulted in humanitarian aid, political and military advancement, as well as civil political achievements. The international and general community views the AMIS operation as a failure considering the heights of the crisis and its refusal to subside (the crisis). Nonetheless, the success as aforementioned relatively are commendable considering also the

number of challenges faced by the operation. I hereby say, despite unaware and unprepared of the African Union, is well done job they have done.

4.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of the above findings and conclusions, the study would like to prefer the following recommendations:

The African Union should devise new means of raising funds within Africa, in addition to minimal contribution from member states and international community, e.g. AU should invest funds from donor countries and from African sources (e.g. private individuals and multi-national corporations). This would enable her execute her mandate in present and perhaps future conflicts in African.

The AU should consult and liaise with the industrialized countries of African and by extension the countries of the third world in the manufacture of equipment and military hardware for logistic support e.g. the AU should promote the manufacture of small and mediums in the continent so easy and cheap accessed could be guaranteed.

AU should concentrate more on the preventive aspects of conflicts in order to minimize resource to peacekeeping, e.g. traditions and native means of conflict settlement should be encouraged to help in reducing the height of local conflicts. Like the Rwandan native settlement style after the genocide.

AU force earmarked for observers of peacekeeping should be involved in joint training to harmonize their equipment in addition to their tactics in line with UN policy on conflict management.

REFERENCES

- African focus Bulletin (2004): Sudan; *Peacekeeping without Peace*
<http://www.Africanfocus.org/country/sudan/php> check on 11th
May 2015.
- Arkell, A.J, “A *History of Darfur Part II: The Junjurede*”. Sudan Notes
and Records, 32,2 (1951).
- Ayo, R. Dunmoye, (2005): *Geo-Politics of African: Cases of Darfur
Sudan*, Congo, Democratic Republic and Liberia; lecture
series, Department of Political Science ABU Zaria.
- Bellamy A.J, William P. Greffin S. (2010), *Understanding
Peacekeeping*, Cambridge: Policy press.
- Benn (2004) “*Race against Time to Save Darfur*” Scotsman 12 June
- Caplan, R. (2008): *Peacekeeping, Encyclopedia Princetoniensis*.
- Catherine Guicherd, *The AU Sudan-lesson for the African Standby
Force/Network: International Peace Academy, March 2007*.
- De Waal, A. (2004): *Darfur Deep Grievances Defy AU Hopes for an
Easy Solution*, observer, 25th July.
- Dualeh H.A, Somalia: *The Agony of a Nation*, (Nairobi Stella groups,
1994).
- Feldman, R.L (2008): *Problems Playing the African Union
Peacekeeping Forces Defense and Security Analysis vol. 24,
No.3 pp 267-279, September 2008*.
- Human Right Watch Report, 2006, Sudan: *Imperative for Immediate
Change*, The African Union Mission in Sudan
- Ibrahim F. (2004): *Ideas on the Background of the Present Conflict in
Darfur*, University of Bayreuth, Germany.
- Interview with Seth Appiah on 9th August 2008 in Newyark.
- James Mackie, Alhaji, Bah, Jonas Frederksen and Stella Sabiti Mid term

- Evaluation of APF, Maastricht: NEIMACRO Group, 2008.
- Kelth, L. (2004): *The African Union in Darfur: An African Solution to a Global Problem pp149-162.*
- Lanz, D. (2008): “*Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations and the DPA*”.
Mediations Support Project, Swiss peace pp18-81.
- Liu FT, the *History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operation during the Cold War: 1945 to 1987* (New York: UNITARPOCI).
- Mark B. Finch, *National Military Strategy: Are U.S Military Forces properly prepared for peacekeeping?* 1993.
- Mark Malan, the O.A.U and Sub-regional Organization. A closer look at the Peace Pyramid (Pretoria: Institute for security studies 1999).
- Mephram, D and Ramsbotham, A (2006): *Darfur, the Responsibility to Project.*
- O.A.U Relaunching African Development (2002): Durban, South Africa.
- Peter Takirambudde, *Darfur: African Union must Insist on more Troops Mandate to Protect Civilians should be Top Priority at Abuja Peace talks, Human Rights Watch, August, 2004.*
- Regional Governance Architecture FES Briefing paper February 2006.
- Scorgie, L.: *Building African Peacekeeping Capacity: Donors and African Unions Emerging Peace and Security Architecture: KAIPTC paper No. 16 April 2007.*
- Sunil Ram, the *History of United Nations Operations from Retrenchment to insurgency: 1997 to 2006* (UNITARPOCI).
- The Charter of the United Nations and Statue of the International Court of Justice (United Nations Department of Public Information).
- The Economist, (2005) April 2nd – 8th London.

The Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Third Edition
(New York: United Nations Department of Public
Information, 1996).

United Nations Peacekeeping on indispensable Weapon in International
Community's Arsenal Secretary-General says on Anniversary
Message of First Mission Pasted as www.un.org accessed on
April 2015.

www.un.org accessed 6th March 2015.